Is the strait of Hormuz, recently cited by the office of the Iranian supreme leader as “the pillar of Iran’s new security order”, and as transformative as possessing a nuclear weapon, in reality becoming a fast-diminishing asset, leaving Iran increasingly vulnerable to the new planned US wave of economic sanctions? It is the key debate that is raging inside Iran, with many different conclusions being drawn for Tehran’s negotiating strategy. Those who warn the strait’s value as a chokehold on the world economy will erode, leaving the country without foreign exchange reserves, argue that Iran’s negotiators should seek a deal soon.
One analysis written by Hamid Paktinat, the founder of the Forum of Economic Activists, suggests the construction of alternative pipelines and export routes by Iran’s Gulf neighbours will halve the strait’s strategic value within three years. Those who worry about wasting assets inevitably set store by the separate visits this week to Tehran of Oman’s foreign minister, Badr Albusaidi, and Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir. These two men are critical to renegotiating the terms for the reopening of the strait and the revival of the discarded memorandum of understanding agreed by the US and Iran in June.
The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and the parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, have both recently made unusually blunt comments about the need to end the war – and the economic consequence of continuing it. Ghalibaf said that regardless of how much military power Iran possessed, “if people are hungry” and there was no economic growth, the country could not endure. Security, he argued, could not be sustained without a functioning economy.
He added that, as someone with a military background, “we know the value of peace better than those who talk about peace”. Pezeshkian was even more blunt: “The war must end at some point,” he said. His argument was that Iran should end the conflict now, while Tehran still believes it is negotiating from a position of strength, rather than wait until its position weakens.
The Iranian central bank governor, Abdolnaser Hemmati, also recently went on TV to warn about the economic pressures. Hamid Asefi, a Tehran-based journalist specialising in geo-economics, is one of many warning that if Hormuz is to be played as Iran’s final card every time a crisis arises, this card will gradually lose its value. The main question is no longer: can Iran close the strait, he wrote, but if Iran closes Hormuz to the world, does it open the door to power for itself or lock part of its power behind that door?
In international politics, a lever that is constantly flaunted can become its own enemy because it forces others to plan to reduce their vulnerability […] the main question of Iranian policy in Hormuz must change from: ‘How can we make the passage difficult?’ to ‘How can we make the passage so safe and stable that everyone needs Iran to maintain this order?’” That does not imply the lever is valueless. According to data compiled by the ship tracker Kpler, only 112 oil and gas tankers went through the strait between 1 and 19 August. Almost 79% used unconfirmed routes, 19% used Iran’s preferred northern route and 2% used the Omani route.
Extract — continue reading at the source.
