On October 8, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim received Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing in Putrajaya with a guard of honour and an official luncheon, in the military chief’s first visit since the 2021 coup. Nine days earlier, Malaysia sent 1,476 Myanmar nationals back by sea in the first phase of a plan to return 5,000 people. Kuala Lumpur calls this pragmatic diplomacy.
In reality, it lends a middle power’s credibility to the Trump administration’s retreat from international accountability, weakening the laws and institutions smaller states rely on most. Since May, a surge of online hate speech and misinformation has targeted the Rohingya, Malaysia’s largest refugee community. By late July, at least nine Rohingya community schools had closed or faced closure orders, and more than 100 Rohingya told UNHCR that residents of their Penang village had driven them out.
The hostility ignores the facts: Malaysia’s police chief says Rohingya account for 0.02 percent of crime. Yet research by INITIATE.MY and the Center for the Study of Organized Hate found AI-generated content amplifying anti-Rohingya disinformation across Malaysia, Indonesia, India and Bangladesh, casting refugees as a threat and legitimising vigilante violence. Electoral politics plays a part.
After heavy losses in three state elections, and with a general election due by February 2028, Anwar’s coalition may see a hard line on Rohingya returns as a show of control, though voter disillusionment and right-wing rivals make any electoral gains uncertain. Malaysia is not acting alone. Mongolia hosted Vladimir Putin in 2024 despite an ICC arrest warrant, and Hungary welcomed Benjamin Netanyahu in 2025 despite another.
Kuala Lumpur denies this is recognition, yet Anwar says Malaysia will work towards Myanmar’s full reintegration into ASEAN, and Min Aung Hlaing wants a seat at the bloc’s November summit in Manila. Each welcome makes the next easier and tells leaders accused of atrocities, from Netanyahu to Min Aung Hlaing, that diplomatic rehabilitation is possible without accountability. ASEAN has tried this before.
In April 2021, Min Aung Hlaing agreed to the Five-Point Consensus, then ignored it: The violence continued, the ASEAN special envoy never met Aung San Suu Kyi, and inclusive dialogue never began. The bloc’s one real lever was excluding military leaders from its summits. Myanmar Specialist, Arkar Hein, said “Welcoming him back with nothing asked in return rewards that defiance and tells Naypyidaw that time and a staged election can achieve what compromise would otherwise require.
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